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Abstract
This article looks at philosophical aspects and questions that modern astrophysical research gives
rise to. Other than cosmology, astrophysics particularly deals with understanding phenomena and
processes operating at “intermediate” cosmic scales, which has rarely aroused philosophical interest
so far. Being confronted with the attribution of antirealism by Ian Hacking because of its obser-
vational nature, astrophysics is equipped with a characteristic methodology that can cope with the
missing possibility of direct interaction with most objects of research. In its attempt to understand the
causal history of singular phenomena it resembles the historical sciences, while the search for general
causal relations with respect to classes of processes or objects can rely on the “cosmic laboratory”:
the multitude of different phenomena and environments, naturally provided by the universe. Further-
more, the epistemology of astrophysics is strongly based on the use of models and simulations and a
complex treatment of large amounts of data.
Keywords: astronomy, astrophysics, observational science, cosmic laboratory, models and simula-
tions, data
1 Introduction
Modern astrophysics1, which operates at the “intermediate” scales (i.e. in between the physics of
the solar system and the cosmology of the entire universe) has rarely been addressed directly within
the philosophy of science context. While there are philosophical sub-disciplines in other special sci-
ences, such as the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of chemistry, today’s non-cosmological
astrophysical research, until now, had failed to arouse philosophical interest in any lasting way.
One reason for this lack of focused interest might have been that, when viewed from the out-
side, astrophysics superficially appears as a special case within the philosophy of physics or as an
extension of the existing philosophy of cosmology. However, both fields seem to deal with slightly
different core themes than the ones that come up in reflecting upon contemporary astrophysical re-
search. In contrast with much of what gets discussed in the philosophy of physics, most astrophysical
research programmes are not at all concerned with metaphysical questions. Rather than the develop-
ment of autonomous mathematical theories that themselves then require specific interpretations, it is
∗This is a draft of a chapter “Astronomy and Astrophysics” that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press
in the forthcoming book “The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science” edited by Paul Humphreys due for publication in
May 2016.
1Often the transition from classical astronomy to today’s astrophysics is denoted as the transition from purely descriptive
astronomical observations to the explanatory application of physical methods to cosmic phenomena. However, in this article
the terms “astrophysics” and “astronomy” will be used interchangeably.
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the application of existing physical theories to a vast array of cosmic phenomena and different envi-
ronments that are found in the universe, which constitutes the main focus of astrophysical research.
Understanding the non-reducible complexity that permeates the universe requires a broad knowledge
of statistical samples rather than a detailed or specific understanding of the ontology of theoretical
entities. Practical problems in astrophysical research are so deeply concerned with methodologies
that arise from the observational constraints imposed on the empirical part of research, that onto-
logical questions are seldom seen to be relevant. More than that, it might not even be clear what a
notion of fundamentality could possibly mean with respect to objects of astrophysical research be-
yond the cases where astrophysics and microphysics meet and where foundational problems might
be inherited from there.
Cosmology, on the other hand, evokes its own metaphysical questions, e.g. when debates cen-
tre around the nature of space and time or the status of cosmological entities like dark matter and
dark energy. Being the study of the origin and the evolution of the universe, cosmology has to face
specific problems that arise from the totality of its research object: in studying the global properties
of a single, uniquely defined object, possible cosmological knowledge is systematically underdeter-
mined. This underdetermination is theoretical on the one hand, but also empirical on the other hand,
because we cannot observe it in its entirety, even in principle. The reason is that light can only reach
us from a limited region of the spacetime, given the limited speed of light and the finite age of the
universe. However, to the extent that cosmology does not only lay claim to understanding the evo-
lution of the universe as a whole, but also the evolution of its large-scale structures, the transition to
non-cosmological astrophysical research that is concerned with the understanding of astrophysical
phenomena on smaller scales is continuous. A philosophy of (non-cosmological) astrophysics and
astronomy will therefore necessarily overlap topics from cosmological research. Some of the episte-
mological questions it faces might however be different from those that are classically discussed for
the case of cosmology, resulting from a more bottom-up point of view as compared to the top-down
case of a cosmology perspective.
Astrophysics and cosmology share a common problem in that they both need to acquire knowl-
edge of their objects of research without directly interacting, manipulating or constraining them.
In reconstructing plausible explanations and evolutionary scenarios of particular, observable objects
and processes, the resulting methodology of astrophysics and cosmology resembles the criminology
of Sherlock Holmes: the astrophysicist must look for all possible traces and clues that may help to
illuminate what has happened in a given region of the universe. However, in contrast to the cosmo-
logical study of the present universe, astrophysics goes beyond the understanding of singular events
and objects and aims at making general statements about classes of objects like O-type stars, the
interstellar medium of galaxies, black holes or clusters of galaxies. Here, inability to stage real ex-
periments imposes a challenge on the establishment of causal claims that may derive from but must
transcend mere correlations. In practice, this can, at least partially, be compensated for by the fact
that the universe is a “Cosmic Laboratory”, that is filled with phenomena and on-going processes in
all manner of evolutionary stages, each of them constrained by different initial conditions and con-
temporary environments. Accordingly, the laboratory scientist’s skill in controlling her experiment
has its correspondence in the astrophysicist’s ability to statistically sample, analyze and model this
diversity that she observes, in the complex process of reaching generalized conclusions about cosmic
phenomena. The understanding of the epistemology of modern astrophysical research certainly can
profit from epistemological studies of other scientific fields (such as paleontology, archaeology, and
the social sciences) that also cannot easily perform experiments and artificially reduce their subject’s
complexity. At the same time, the ubiquitous use of simulations and models and the challenges that
the ever increasing generation of the huge amount of data imposes on astrophysics make correspond-
ing discussions from the philosophy of science relevant for the reflection on astrophysical research.
Finally, astrophysical research is an interesting topic with respect to its practical organisation and
realization, which opens the discussion to historical and sociological directions. The generation of
empirical astrophysical knowledge relies on the distribution of observing time at usually internation-
ally operated observatories. The distribution is based on applications by individual researchers or
research collaborations and decided upon in a peer review process by a panel of scientists. As astron-
omy rarely takes place at small observatories located at the universities anymore, extensive division
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of work in the generation of data and the essential role of international science policy have a growing
influence on the practice of research. This evolution of astrophysics not only makes it an interest-
ing topic for social-scientific and philosophical epistemological reflections on their own, at the same
time such reflection may also yield important guidance for the challenges and future policy decisions
astrophysics has to face in times of increasingly expensive research programmes and exponentially
growing amounts of generated data.
In Section 2, Ian Hacking’s claim of astrophysical antirealism will be taken as a starting point
and a motivation to subsequently shed light on the specific methodology of astrophysics in Section
3. In Sections 4 and 5, aspects of the discussions of scientific modelling and data generation, pro-
cessing and interpretation that are relevant for astrophysics will be summarized, before the article is
concluded in Section 6.
2 Astrophysical Antirealism
Astrophysics deals with phenomena and processes that are found occurring in significantly more
extreme conditions than anything that can artificially be generated in a terrestrial laboratory. The
range of temperatures, pressures, spatial scales and time scales pertinent to astrophysical phenomena
are larger than anything that is commonly accessible to humans by direct experience. Also, the often
dominant influence of gravity sets astrophysical processes apart from terrestrial laboratory settings.
While applying physical methods to cosmic phenomena, astronomers have to deal with the fact that it
is impossible to interact directly with the objects of astrophysical interest. Curiously, this prohibition
might not only have practical consequences for the way in which astrophysical research is done, but
it may also impact the ontological status of the objects of research themselves.
In his book “Representing and Intervening” (Hacking, 1983) Ian Hacking tried to link scientific
realism to the ability of experimenters to manipulate the object of their research. By this definition, he
cannot attribute the claim of realism to astrophysical objects because direct interaction with cosmic
phenomena is impossible (except to a limited degree within the Solar System). Accordingly, Hack-
ing (1989) argues for an antirealism when it comes to cosmic phenomena. His exemplary argument
cites the ambiguities involved in interpreting the observations of theoretically predicted gravitational
lensing events. If, as he claims, the universe is awash with non-detectable microlenses distorting
and aberrating light as it traverses space, then all astronomical observations would be inherently
untrustworthy. Distorting influences of microlenses on the observed photon fluxed could never be
disentangled from intrinsic features of the source. In this context, he revisits the Barnothys’ sugges-
tion in 1965 that quasars are not a separate class of cosmic objects but rather they are Seyfert galaxies
subject to gravitational lensing.
While an interaction with the object of research enables systematic tests of possible sources of
error in experimental disciplines, this option is prohibited in astrophysics. Instead, astrophysics de-
pends on the use of models brought in line with the observed phenomenon - a fact upon which Hack-
ing builds his second argument against astrophysical realism. The limited nature of the modelling
approach, together with the fact that cosmic phenomena can be described by a multitude of adequate
but mutually contradictory models shows, according to Hacking, that astrophysics cannot make a
claim to realism, if realism is understood to entail a convergence of scientific descriptions towards
truth. On the basis of these considerations, in a third argument, Hacking then claims a “method-
ological otherness” for astronomy and astrophysics, as compared with other, realistic scientific dis-
ciplines. The transition to a natural science, according to Hacking, is marked by the application of
experimental methods. Astronomy has not made that transition. Although astronomical technology
has changed drastically since the historical beginnings of this discipline, Hacking sees the underlying
methodology as having remained the same: “Observe the heavenly bodies. Construct models of the
(macro)cosmos. Try to bring observations and models into line” (Hacking, 1989; p. 577).
There have been several replies to this rather severe view of the status of modern astrophysics,
and each of his three arguments has been attacked (e.g., Shapere, 1993; Sandell, 2010). First of
all, his example of microlenses does not seem to be at all representative of astrophysical research.
Moreover the study of gravitational lensing was still in its infancy at that time. Today it is quite
possible for astrophysicists to observationally decide on the presence (or not) of microlenses. This
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demonstrates the fact that often theoretical as well as technological progress can eventually resolve
problems of apparent underdetermination, as is the case for Hacking’s prime example given above.
This point is related to the fact that observational evidence for or against a given theory does not
depend on the theory alone, but it also involves and entails auxiliary hypotheses, available instruments
and background assumptions (e.g. Laudan & Leplin, 1991). If these auxiliaries are changed, the
observational evidence for a theory might change as well, and subsequently give rise to differences in
the observational support for previously empirically degenerate theories. Similarly, the theory itself
may become further developed at a later time and allow for new predictions that can in turn be tested
with new observations. For instance, in the case of gravitational microlenses, progress in our detailed
theoretical understanding of lensing events in general has suggested that time-dependent brightening
and fading of the emission of a microlensed background object can discriminate microlensing from
properties intrinsic to the source itself. Compared with the situation Hacking describes, today we
are actually able to predict observable differences between a theory that includes microlenses and
one that does not. Although the argument by Laudan and Leplin (1991) does not guarantee that
the problem of so-called “contrastive underdetermination”2 will always be solved sooner or later, it
might explain the faith that scientists usually put in “abductive justification” of their science; that
is, if a theory is the best possible explanation of the given empirical evidence, it might very likely
be true (and if it is not, then they will find out at some later point). Accordingly, Hacking seems to
have underestimated the improved understanding of astronomers and the power of their method of
research.
Hacking’s second argument, referring to the ubiquitous use of models in astrophysics, has impli-
cations that reaches well beyond astronomy. Models and simulations are crucial tools in basically
all fields of modern sciences. Accordingly, applying this argument would mean questioning the re-
alist status of most of today’s scientific research. Apart from that, as will be discussed in Section 4,
astrophysical models are being continuously refined and improved. Moreover, new and varied obser-
vations are brought to bear in resolving ambiguities between different models. In that regard, models
in astrophysics are very often critically discussed and reflected upon, and scientists are very careful
with a realistic interpretation of features of these models and simulations because their limitations
are usually obvious.
Hacking’s third argument concerning a fundamental difference between experimental and obser-
vational disciplines is more general than the two previous arguments, and raises two basic questions
in response: (a) Does the Hacking criterion for scientific realism make sense in general? And (b)
Are there really any significant epistemic differences between astrophysics and experimental sci-
ences? The first question has been extensively discussed quite independently of its application to
astrophysics (e.g. Resnik, 1994; Reiner and Pierson, 1995), and we refer the reader to that litera-
ture. Regarding the second question, a closer look at astrophysical research practice demonstrates
that the distinction between experimental and observational sciences is more subtle than it seems at
first sight. The crucial part is to clarify what Hacking’s experimental argument explicitly means and
comprises. In “Representing and Intervening” (1983) he gives several explanations of what it means
for an entity to be real. Besides the “strong requirement”, that direct manipulation of the entity has
to be possible, a weaker version of the criterion can be found in Hacking’s additional proposal that
an entity can be real if its well-understood causal properties can be used to interfere with other parts
of nature.
Shapere (1993) has built on this ambiguity of definition and apparent lack of conceptual clarity
when he stresses that the “use” of cosmic phenomena in the investigation of others is indeed possi-
ble, even when the phenomena under consideration cannot be directly or interactively manipulated.
Gravitational lensing, for instance, can and has been widely used for the detection of dark matter
and for distance determinations. For Shapere the scientific method is not so much based on exper-
imental interaction, but rather on the practice of extrapolating from knowledge already obtained to
2Contrastive underdetermination describes the idea that for each body of possible evidence there may well exist several
different, but equally empirically adequate theories. Stanford (2013) contrasts this use of the term underdetermination with
“holist underdetermination”, which describes the fact that a general theory can always be held even in the light of countervailing
evidence. This is because the evidence depends not only on the tested claim, but also on many other auxiliary hypotheses, which
could also be equally wrong.
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something novel. In this perspective, astronomy is perfectly in line with the other natural sciences.
Sandell (2010) argues in the same vein when she suggests that astronomers do in fact carry out exper-
iments, even within Hacking’s meaning of manipulating or, equivalently, utilizing the causal powers
of phenomena. Astronomical objects also have causal impact, which can be detected by astronomers
to generate stable phenomena (e.g., measurement results of a receiver.)
Based on these arguments, it would appear that there is in fact no fundamental difference between
astrophysics and other scientific disciplines when it comes down to scientific realism3. However,
Hacking’s article raises an interesting epistemological question. Specifically, if his argument on the
possible distorting influence of microlenses is read as a variation of the strong underdetermination
argument (e.g., the idea that for each body of possible evidence there might exist several different, but
equally “empirically adequate” theories), the question remains whether experimental sciences have
a larger tool box at their disposal to prevent such situations. Could it be the case that astrophysics is
particularly prone to intrinsic underdetermination operating on several levels? For instance, is under-
determination found both at the level of astrophysical observations and at the level of astrophysical
modelling, because of its intrinsic observational basis? In order to investigate this question, a closer
look at the astrophysical method, as currently practiced, may well be in order. We do this in the next
section.
3 The Astrophysical Method
3.1 The Sherlock Holmes Strategy
A significant part of astrophysical research is dedicated to the understanding of singular instances
of objects (e.g., the Class 0 protostar NGC 1333-IRAS4B) or a specific process (e.g., the gaseous
outflow from the active galactic nucleus in PG1211+143). The basic question in such cases is this:
What do the observations tell us about the physics and chemistry at work in the observed region?
Or more generally: which circumstances have led to what we observe? These scientific questions
resemble corresponding questions in the “historical sciences”. Historical research concerns itself
with the explanation of existing, natural phenomena in terms of their past (and sometimes distant)
causes. The fact that the causes are past means that the causal chain cannot be subject to investigation
itself: the investigator finds herself in a “Sherlock-Holmes situation”. Classical historical sciences in
this sense of investigation are paleontology, archaeology and some aspects of global climate change.
Historical sciences seem to differ from experimental sciences with respect to their restricted mode of
evidential reasoning (e.g. Cleland, 2002). The experimental activity usually begins with a hypothesis,
from which a test condition C is inferred together with a general prediction about what should happen
if C is realized and the hypothesis is true.
For instance, the hypothesis could be that astrophysicists are not interested in philosophy. The
test condition C could be a lunch conversation about Kant’s “transcendental idealism” and the pre-
diction would be that the astrophysicist will change the topic of discussion, or leave after no more
than a minute. The series of experiments then contains several experimental tests, in which C is held
fixed while other experimental conditions are varied in order to exclude misleading confirmation and
disconfirmation. Within the previous example, the test could be performed with a different philo-
sophical speaker, because maybe the first speaker is intrinsically boring (independent of the topic),
or the test may be rerun with a different philosophical topic than Kant, given that Kant might not be
representative overall for philosophy, etc. This strategy tries to reduce the holistic underdetermina-
tion by checking different auxiliaries or confounding variables for their individual influence on the
experimental prediction.
In contrast, historical sciences start from a situation that would be the experimental outcome or,
in Cleland’s words, they start from the traces of past causes. In the previous example, the evidence
would be simply watching the astrophysicist leave the lunch table, and then the problem would be
in having to reconstruct what led to this particular behaviour. Or, to take a more realistic exam-
3An interesting, but unrelated, argument against a realist interpretation of astrophysical objects is based on the ambiguity
and interest-dependence of astrophysical classifications. See Ruphy (2010) and Footnote 4.
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ple, if the question of the extinction of dinosaurs is being investigated, examples of such evidential
traces may be a geological layer of sediment containing high levels of (extraterrestrial) iridium and
the Chicxulub crater in the Gulf of Mexico, that pointed to a prehistoric asteroid impact. In as-
trophysics, these traces are in most cases electromagnetic photons that may be created by a wide
variety of different processes. For instance, the interaction between the explosion of a supernova
and a molecular cloud would lead to highly excited spectral lines that are significantly broadened by
the shock interaction between the supernova remnant and the cloud. The scientific task is then to
hypothesize a common, local cause for these traces (high excitation, line broadening) and thereby to
unify them under one, self-consistent, causal story. In the astrophysical example, broad lines could
alternatively be explained by several molecular clouds moving at different velocities along the line
of sight. This possible cause of a broad spectral line would however not easily explain the existence
of highly excited transitions and requires an independent causal story to explain this second trace,
while a possible shock interaction unifies both.
At first sight, this “Sherlock Holmes”-procedure seems like a very uncertain business, given the
complexity of possible interactions in a potentially very long causal chain leading up to the remaining
traces. However, at least there is a clear methodological direction to go in such a situation, namely to
search for the so-called “smoking guns” (Cleland, 2002): traces that are able to discriminate between
competing hypotheses, which distinguish one hypothesis as currently being the best explanation. For
instance, if a shock interaction is hypothesized, other spectral lines that are predicted to arise in a
shock should be observable as well. If they are not seen, alternative explanations of the already
observed traces and their respective observable consequences will have to be further investigated.
Doing that, the scientist has to rely on what nature has already provided, there is no way to intervene
and actively create such “smoking gun” situations.
This fact might give rise to the intuition that historical sciences have to face a methodological
disadvantage and are therefore epistemologically inferior to experimental research. However, Cle-
land claims that the situation is revised by a time asymmetry of nature (Lewis, 1979; Cleland, 2002)
that creates an asymmetry of overdetermination. The laws of nature are directed in time: if an event
has occurred, it is very difficult to make things look like nothing had happened. The situation seems
analogous to criminal cases, where it is reasonable to hope that the culprit has left some traces that
will make it possible to identify him. In this sense, it is difficult to fake past events, i.e. to create
all expectable traces artificially without the occurrence of the actual event. While in an experimental
approach, the underdetermination problem makes it difficult to find the “true” (responsible) causes
for an observed outcome, the richness of traces in historical science cases can help to distinguish
true causes from faked causes. The large number of effects that an event usually creates leads to a so
called “overdetermination of causes” (Lewis, 1979). Even if a significant number of traces is erased,
the remaining traces might be enough to determine their unifying cause. This, however, does not
imply that humans will necessarily have access to these traces: “Traces may be so small, far flung,
or complicated hat no human being could ever decode them.” (Cleland, 2002; p. 488).
Whether this alleged asymmetry really makes it easier to infer past causes (due to causal overde-
termination) than to predict the future behaviour of a system (due to underdetermination of future
events) as Cleland claims, seems less obvious. The large number of potential causally relevant but
unidentified auxiliary factors in experimental situations may be faced with a large number of possi-
ble explanations that unify the limited set of observed traces in observational situations. Actually,
in a thought experiment where an experimental setting is transformed into an observational one (by
cutting the possibility of interactions with the experimental setup), it seems possible to objectively
cross-link the set of possible alternative explanations with the set of possible causally relevant aux-
iliary factors. Accordingly, the epistemic situation in terms of underdetermination seems to be very
similar for experimental and historical sciences. So far the argument was based on the “Sherlock
Holmes” strategy as found in the historical sciences, which corresponds to the understanding of sin-
gular objects and events in astrophysics. However, the astrophysical method is obviously richer than
that.
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3.2 The Cosmic Laboratory
Although astrophysics shows some resemblances to historical sciences like paleontology or arche-
ology, there is one fundamental difference: astrophysics does not stop at the understanding of the
causal history of singular events. Instead, it ultimately tries to find general causal relations with
respect to classes of processes or objects, like protostellar molecular outflows, A-type stars, spiral
galaxies or galaxy clusters4. This opens new methodological routes to follow: now causal relations
can be investigated based on a whole class of phenomena and therefore statistical methods can be ap-
plied. In this context, astrophysicists like to refer to the “cosmic laboratory” (e.g., Pasachoff, 1977).
The universe harbours such a variety of objects in various evolutionary states and conditions, that the
experimentalist’s activity of creating variations of the initial experimental condition might be already
set up by the universe itself in all its naturally manifest diversity.
However, the problem remains how to preclude the influence of auxiliary factors or confound-
ing variables on a hypothetical cause-effect relationship. How can the astrophysicist relate a certain
behaviour or a certain property of a class of objects or processes rather than to the contingent environ-
mental conditions or the specific context of the observation? That is, how can an observed correlation
between observational parameters be transformed into a causal relationship?
The classic way to deal with the exploration of effects based on hypothetical causes is the “coun-
terfactual model” (e.g. Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). If a certain effect is observed in a
particular situation and ascribed to the existence of one particular factor, the crucial question for the
claim of a causal relationship is whether the effect would have also occurred without the respective
factor being in play. This method was already briefly described above as a way to deal with poten-
tially causally relevant auxiliary factors. The perfect counterfactual inference would compare the
occurring effects in two absolutely identical experimental situations that only differ with respect to
the factor in question. This is however impossible. If an experiment is repeated, something else that
was not mirrored by the experimenter might as well have been changed and lead to a change in the
observed effect that is then incorrectly ascribed to the factor under investigation. In the experimental
sciences, “randomized controlled experiments” yield a possible solution to this problem. Two groups
of units, the so-called control and the treatment groups, are statistically similar on average but differ
with respect to the factor under study. Therefore, the influence of possible confounding variables
should on average cancel out for both groups and is no threat to the inferred causal relationship any-
more. The challenge for astrophysics, as well as for social scientists, economists and other scientists
that cannot easily perform experiments, is to find a method to deal with the influence of confounding
variables that does not rely on experimental interaction with the objects of research.
Two possible methods are usually described in that context (e.g., Shadish, Cook, and Campbell,
2002; Dunning, 2012): Quasi-experiments and natural experiments. Natural experiments are the di-
rect equivalent of randomized controlled experiments in an observational situation. The idea is that
statistically similar groups of units, that only differ with respect to one factor, may sometimes be
created by naturally occurring processes, which accordingly create an “as-if random” assignment.
A classic example is the investigation of cholera transmission in nineteenth-century London (Dun-
ning, 2012). The question whether cholera could be explained by the theory of “bad air” or was
rather transmitted by infected water could be settled due to the particular structure of water supply
in London at that time. Two different water companies served most parts of London. One obtained
its water from upstream London on the Thames while the other got its water from the Thames in-
side of London where the water was contaminated by the sewage of London. The anesthesiologist
John Snow could then show that the cholera death rate was dependent on the source of water supply.
Because both groups of households were statistically equivalent on average, other reasons for the
4Ruphy (2010) points out that it is an interesting topic on its own to study the taxonomies and classifications that are used
in astrophysics in order to group entities whose diversity is scientifically investigated. Using the example of stellar taxonomies,
she stresses the strong role of epistemic interest in establishing astrophysical classifications, which, e.g., usually depend on the
particular observational wavelength regime, the observational resolution, and often don’t have sharp boundaries when they are
based, in fact, on continuous parameters. These properties of astrophysical classifications might give interesting inputs to the
monism/pluralism and realism/antirealism debates, as Ruphy shows that the same structural kind-membership condition leads
to several possible and interest-dependent groupings of things and that realism about stellar kinds is therefore problematic.
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difference in the cholera death rate could be excluded. The main advantage of natural experiments
is that their analysis is very simple, without necessarily calling for complicated statistical modelling.
If a difference is observed between the control and the treatment group, it is most likely due to the
specific factor in which both groups differ. The demanding part, however, is to decide whether the
naturally created assignment is indeed “as-if random”. This decision usually requires comprehensive
qualitative information on the context of the alleged natural experiment. Also, the existence of a nat-
ural experiment is a fortunate event that might not be easy to find and that, obviously, is impossible
to force.
Quasi-experiments (Campbell and Stanley, 1966), in contrast, are experiments in which a con-
trol and a treatment group are compared without random assignment being realized. Accordingly,
the treatment group may differ from the control group in many ways other than the factor under
study. In order to apply the counterfactual inference, all the alternative explanations that rely on
other systematic differences between the groups have to be excluded or falsified. The influence of
such confounding factors could in turn be investigated by dedicated experiments, but as this is usu-
ally a far too complex option to pursue. The confounding factors are often assessed by conventional
quantitative methods, such as multivariate regression. Also, numerical models and simulations of
the observed phenomenon can be used to explore the possible, “covariant”, influence of these fac-
tors. Another technique to deal with confounding factors is the application of so-called matching:
the units in comparison are chosen in a way that known confounding variables can be measured and
accounted for. The classical example for this method is a medical study that works with twins and
can therefore rely on the far-reaching equivalence of the systems under study.
The question now becomes: Which of these methods are applied in today’s astrophysical re-
search? Does the cosmic laboratory in its vast variety offer as-if randomized assignments that allow
for the targeted study of causal relationships? On first sight, a good candidate seems to be the study
of evolutionary processes occurring over cosmic time-scales. Due to the finite speed of light astro-
physicists are able to observe the past of the universe and thereby populations of cosmic objects in
different evolutionary stages. This means that astrophysicists can literally look at the same universe
at various earlier points in time. However, the objects in this earlier universe are not statistically
equivalent to their present counterparts apart from their earlier age because the environmental condi-
tions in the universe have changed in time as well. Therefore, this situation resembles the matching
technique, where (hopefully) known confounding factors need to be evaluated separately, rather than
it being a truly natural experiment.
In order to evaluate the possibility of the existence of natural experiments in astrophysics more
generally, one first of all needs to identify processes that may create as-if randomized assignments.
The answer is not obvious at all, even though cases of so-called “regression-discontinuity” designs
(see Dunning, 2002) might be conceivable (i.e., cases where two different groups of objects are dis-
tinguished relative to a threshold value of some variable). For instance, one could perform a study
that compares molecular cloud cores that are just on the brink of gravitational collapse (expressed
by the ratio of the gravitational and the stabilizing pressure forces) with those cores in the same
molecular cloud that have just become gravitationally unstable. However, the existence of natural
experiments in an astrophysical context seems to be hindered by the fundamental difficulty involved
in obtaining enough qualitative, contextual information on the different groups of objects or processes
under study. This contextual information is necessary to make a valid decision on the existence of
“as-if randomization”. In this example, the application of a threshold criterion is already rather
complicated, because a decision as to which cores are just on the edge of gravitational instability is
already very strongly theory-laden. Furthermore, astronomy is subject to observational constraints
that introduce additional selection effects, leading to observational biases. The further the objects
are away from Earth, the weaker is the received photon flux and the poorer is the spatial resolution
of the object for equivalent observations (i.e., if the same telescope, same instrument, same angular
resolution, and same signal-to-noise, etc. are used and obtained.) If a class of objects is observed
at the same distance, it is not clear how representative those particular objects are for other regions
of the universe. Also, if objects are observed in different directions, the effects of the ambient in-
terstellar medium along the line-of-sight between the observer and the object needs to be evaluated
and compensated for. Factors like this might explain why the concept “cosmic laboratory” is usu-
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ally not associated with natural experiments and corresponding as-if randomization. The term is
rather used in the following sense: Astrophysicists can use a multitude of different phenomena, pro-
vided by the universe in various environments and evolutionary states, in order to perform/observe
quasi-experiments. However, the evaluation of these quasi-experiments requires the application of
sophisticated statistical methods and the use of models and simulations, which in turn are often used
as substitutes for traditional experiments.
4 Models and Simulations in Astrophysics
Hacking (1989) considered scientific modelling as a particularly important ingredient of astrophysi-
cal research: “I suspect that there is no branch of natural science in which modeling is more endemic
than astrophysics, nor one in which at every level modeling is more central.” (p. 573). Whether one
is willing to acknowledge such a special role for astrophysics, or not, its scientific practice does ap-
pear to be determined by modelling efforts on many different levels. The developmental time scales
of many cosmic phenomena are so long that directly observing their evolution is simply not possible
in a human lifetime. The accessible cosmic sample of objects in various evolutionary states is then
reassembled as a self-consistent time series within a given evolutionary model, augmented and aided
by simulations.
Models and simulations however always rely on idealisations, simplifications, and assumptions
about the modelled object itself. Therefore the question of the reliability and validity of the results
obtained by models and simulations is central. In astrophysics, unlike climate science and economics,
it can be studied largely independent of political and/or public interest. As the results of astrophysical
simulations cannot be tested experimentally, the only possible empirical test is a comparison with
static observations. These usually result in a relatively weak measure of adequacy, because exact
quantitative agreement between simulation and observation is only to be expected in exceptional
cases. Alternatively, different simulations can be compared among each other, and a simulation can
be tested for inner consistency and physical correctness (e.g. Sundberg, 2010).
The debate concerning models and simulations is of course an independent and vibrant activity
within the philosophy of science community. Only a handful of publications, however, explicitly
deal with the more philosophical or foundational aspects of modelling and simulations in astro-
physics. Numerical models of astrophysical phenomena are often developed and refined over a long
period of time, and can involve a large number and several generations of collaborators. A rep-
resentative example of a collective and international modelling process, comprising a longstanding
sequence of model-modifications, data generation and investigation of theoretical implications, was
reconstructed by Grasshoff (1998). He investigated how the collective of participating researchers
interacts despite their great diversity with respect to their experience, knowledge and understanding
of the overall model. The split-up of the model of a phenomenon into partial sub-models, which are
easier to handle, has been described by Bailer-Jones (2000). These sub-models are easier to handle,
but need to be theoretically and empirically consistent if they are to be embedded at a higher level
of application and generalisation. As an important aspect for the recreation of the unity of various
sub-models, she identifies the visualisation of the phenomenon that supplies concrete interpretations
of these sub-models. However, the often contingent choice of sub-models and the rigidity of mod-
els that grow over generations of modellers are aspects that calls for critical reflection. Using the
example of cosmological simulations and modelling of the Milky Way, Ruphy (2011) stressed that
many simulations are theoretically not well constrained. There are many possible paths of modelling
opened by the necessary choices between different sub-models. This yields a potential or also actual
plurality of models that all claim to model the same cosmic phenomenon. Typically, different models
are mutually incompatible, but still empirically adequate to a similar degree. This situation creates
a problem if it is possible to adjust the models to new empirical data by retroactively increasing
the complexity of the new model, while keeping their previous modelling contents. This occurs in
situations where no testing of the ingoing sub-models is even possible, which is often the case in
astrophysics. In such a situation it becomes impossible to claim an understanding of the real world
from the models just on the basis of their empirical adequacy. At best these are plausible fits to the
limited input data.
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That said, the current modelling practice in astrophysics appears highly heterogeneous, depend-
ing on the maturity and developmental stage of the astrophysical sub-discipline, modulated by the
richness and availability of observational input. Simulations of extragalactic objects confronted with
large uncertainties of ingoing theories and severe empirical constraints seem to struggle with differ-
ent problems from those of the simulations of cosmic phenomena that can be observed within our
Milky Way, with high spatial resolution using different information channels.
It is important to note that models also play an important role within astronomical data acquisition
and reduction. For instance, the recording of data using a single dish radio telescope requires a
model of the mechanical and optical properties of the telescope mirror in different positions in order
to determine the exact pointing position. For the calibration of data with respect to influences of
atmospheric influences a model of the Earth’s atmosphere is needed. Flux calibration presupposes
models of the individual stars and planets used in the calibrating observations. As in many complex
scientific disciplines, astrophysics is subject to a “hybrid” solution, where a clear distinction between
empirical data and model-based interpretation is becoming more and more difficult. This situation
might challenge elements of the modelling discussion that have occurred so far (e.g. Morrison, 2009).
Moreover, planned or newly commissioned instruments, such as the ALMA interferometer, bring
about a tremendous improvement of the empirical observational basis, while at the same time the
need for easy to use, standardized models is growing. Thereby, questions for the verification, val-
idation and standardisation of simulations gain additional importance, emphasized by a common
differentiation of labour between modellers and model-users.
5 Astrophysical Data
Astrophysics is fast becoming a science that that is confronting many large, multi-wavelength surveys
and dealing with huge amounts of data. For example, the planned Square Kilometre Array will create
data at a rate of many Petabytes per second. Accordingly, in addition to models and simulations,
data handling is another central component of astrophysical research that is worthy of philosophical
reflection. In order to do so it too can draw on contemporary discussions from the philosophy of
science.
Suppes (1962) first spoke of “data models”, by pointing at a hierarchy of models that link raw
data to theory. According to Suppes, the relationship between a data model and the underlying
data is given by a detailed statistical theory of the “goodness of the fit”. The semantic concept of
models of theories is thereby extended in its application towards models of experiments and models
of data. Harris (2003) has illustrated this concept of data models, using planetary observations as an
example: he shows that bad observations of planetary positions are first dismissed and the remaining
data points are smoothed, such that the finally plotted path of the planet would constitute a data
model: on the one hand it is similar to the original data, on the other hand the plot is an idealization
that is qualitatively different from the data. At the same time, the very concept of data models
underwrites the inevitability of there being different ways to model data. In that sense the concept
of unprocessed “raw data” is of questionable value surely, because “the process of data acquisition
cannot be separated from the process of data manipulation” (Harris, 2003; p. 1512). Even for the
simplest instruments it is necessary for the scientist to possess certain learned skills to properly read
the data.
With their distinction between data and phenomena, Bogen and Woodward (1988) drew attention
to the experimental practice within science, specifically the practice of data analysis and data selec-
tion, which had been neglected within the theory-dominated discussions of the philosophy of science.
The strategies for the prevention of errors and the extraction of “patterns” that yield the properties of
the underlying phenomena thereby constitute an epistemology of the experiment, which has become
another active branch within the philosophy of science. It is interesting to apply these strategies to
astrophysical data analyses. While the strategies applied are very similar to experimental physics,
knowledge of the details of data generation that is needed in order to distinguish real features in the
data from mere artefacts might not always be easily accessible given the ever growing differentiation
of labour in observational astrophysics (e.g. Anderl, 2014).
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There are several ways in which astronomical observations might actually be made (Longair,
Stewart, and Williams, 1986; Jaschek, 1989; Zijlstra, Rodriguez, and Wallander, 1995). Not all of
these modes are necessarily made available at any given observatory, telescope or instrument due
to practicalities, cost factors and/or institutional policies. The four most common modes are: 1)
Classical Observing: Here the astronomer carries out the observations herself at the telescope itself,
in real time, and she is commonly assisted by a local team, consisting of telescope operators, staff
scientists and instrument specialists. 2) Remote Observing. Here the local staff actually operate
the telescope while the astronomer is not physically present, but she is still has the authority and
responsibility to decide in real time on the target selection, integration times, filters, etc, in real time.
3) Queue Observing. In this case the instrument is operated under pre-programmed, and advanced-
scheduled remote control. This is generally the case for unmanned telescopes, but it is also a mode
undertaken in order to optimally schedule telescopes at many remote facilities. 4) Service Observing.
In this instance, the astronomer provides the technical staff at the telescope the necessary details
needed to perform a complete suite of her observations. The instructions are provided in advance of
scheduled observations, they are executed without her being present or on-line, and the data are sent
to her after the observations have been made.
The history seems to indicate that service observing is becoming quite popular as far as ground-
based observations are concerned. However, even if the astronomer travels to the site herself,
the technical complexity of the instruments involved usually requires specialized technicians to be
present, who know the specifics of the instrument and how to achieve optimal performance. It is
interesting that in the case of service mode observing a change of subject takes place with the con-
comitant possibility of information loss between the recording of raw data, and the data reduction and
subsequent data analysis. In order to distinguish valid results from instrumental artefacts or blunders,
it is necessary that the astronomical instruments are understood at a relatively high level and it is to
be hoped that no relevant information concerning the process of data generation is undocumented or
lost. Accordingly, it is a challenge for the design of archival astronomical databases to provide as
much of that information on data generation and applied data manipulation as possible.
However, an epistemological analysis of data generation and data treatment has so far not thor-
oughly been conducted from a philosophical perspective within modern astrophysics. In contrast,
the social sciences are home to a broad discussion on topics such as data-access, databases, and
increasing data intensity of scientific cooperations. This discussion also refers to examples from
astrophysics (e.g Collins, 1998; Wynholds et al., 2012; Sands et al., 2012). A philosophical investi-
gation of data generation, -selection and -reduction within astronomy appears particularly interesting,
as astrophysicists like to stress their status as passive observers: they only gather information that can
be received from the universe.
In fact, modern observational methods require much more manipulation and interaction than the
classic picture of the astronomer looking through his or her telescope might suggest. Even before
the so-called raw data is generated, many decisions have to be made, which depend on the observer’s
intention with respect to the usage of the data. Furthermore, the calibration of the telescope, the
calibration of the data regarding the atmosphere’s influence and the calibration of the receiver used
are very complex processes, which rely on assumptions and models. After the user has received the
data, he or she is confronted with various tasks: sorting out bad data, data calibration, searching
for systematic errors and, if present, correcting for them and finally visualising the data so that a
scientific interpretation is possible. Depending on the observational technique and instrumentation
used, this process of data reduction can become extremely complex.
One extreme case in that respect is given by the technique of interferometry, where observations
acquired by multiple telescopes are pairwise combined in order to simulate one large telescope having
a resolution corresponding to the distance between the two most widely separated elements of the
array of telescopes. This technique relies on the measurement of Fourier components of the source
distribution on the sky, so that the intensity distribution needs to be determined by means of a Fourier
transformation. At the same time, information on the underlying spatial intensity in the source plane
is lost due to an incomplete sampling of the virtual surface of the simulated large telescope. The
central step within the data reduction therefore cannot unambiguously reconstruct the real source
distribution, but rather it can provide a plausible reconstruction, which is compatible both with the
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input data and with the real intensity distribution of the source on the sky. This “data inversion”
problem might well serve as an example of true “underdetermination” in astrophysics.
In any case, with respect to the complexity of data generation and processing there seems to be
no obvious difference between astronomy and experimental sciences. It is interesting to note that this
fact is even acknowledged by Hacking (1989), although he so firmly stresses the difference between
astronomy and the experimental sciences5.
The more complex the process of data selection and analysis becomes, the more the processing
of data also relies on experience. Accordingly, instructions on astronomical data reduction are not
found in textbooks and often only briefly in documentations of the respective software packages. The
practice of data reduction is rather transferred in schools or workshops or directly among colleagues.
This practice contains strong elements of what Polanyi (1958) described as “tacit knowledge”, dis-
tinguished from explicit knowledge (see also Collins, 2010). The existence of tacit knowledge can
become a problem if it causes a loss of information with respect to data-genesis and the context of
data processing when data gets transferred. Within modern astrophysical practice, which works in-
creasingly based on the division of labour and is directed towards a multiple use of data, the question
arises how databases and corresponding data formats can be organized as to prevent a negative impact
on the meaningfulness of the data.
6 Summary and Outlook
Modern non-cosmological astrophysics is a scientific discipline that has so far not been prominently
discussed within the philosophy of science. However, the richness, complexity and extremity of its
objects of research, together with its characteristic methodology as an observational science, make
astrophysics an interesting field for philosophical analysis. In its attempt to understand the cosmic
history of distinct singular objects and processes, it resembles historical sciences as archaeology or
paleontology, while its effort to derive general claims on the behaviour of classes of objects and pro-
cesses is reminiscent of social sciences, neither of which are in a position to perform experiments.
All these activities, however, are backed up by far reaching modelling and simulation efforts. The
question for the possible scope and inherent limits of such models appears pressing in the case of
astrophysics as the possibilities of verification and validation of these models are usually limited.
Astrophysics is dealing with ever growing amounts of data that are usually generated by large inter-
national observatories and finally delivered to the scientific user. The complexity of data generation,
data reduction and data analysis and the reuse of data from large databases calls for a critical reflec-
tion of these practices and their epistemic premises. This article is intended to encourage philosoph-
ical interest in astrophysical research, as astrophysics may offer a wealth of novel, interesting and
yet still untreated, questions and case studies that may yield new impetus to various philosophical
discussions.
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5
“It is sometimes said that in astronomy we do not experiment; we can only observe. It is true that we cannot interfere
very much in the distant reaches of space, but the skills employed by Penzias and Wilson [S.A.: the discoverers of the cosmic
microwave background] were identical to those used by laboratory experimenters.” (Hacking, 1983; p. 160).
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